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THE LIMITS OF THE ‘DEMOCRATIC COUP’ THESIS:  
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND POST-COUP AUTHORITARIANISM 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recent studies have suggested that post-Cold War coups are much more likely to be 
followed by democratic elections than their Cold War predecessors, and that this trend 
is the result of the rise of international policies of democratic conditionality. Some 
argue we live in an age of the ‘democratic coup’. This paper makes two principal 
contributions to the debate on the relationship between coups and regime type. First, it 
presents an analysis of the post-coup trajectories of coup countries after 1991. Using 
descriptive statistics to highlight trends across the post-Cold War cases, the analysis 
raises questions over any optimistic view of the capacity of coups to contribute to 
long-term democratization. While there is a clear trend for holding post-coup 
elections within five years of a coup, most countries experiencing coups fail to go on 
to establish high quality democratic rule and consolidate some form of authoritarian 
rule. Coups are not a force for democracy. Second, the paper adds to our 
understanding of the international dimensions of post-coup political development by 
highlighting the role of international autocratic sponsors. When states are strategically 
important, or when they have strong linkages to non-western autocracies, coup leaders 
are likely to receive international support and protection rather than condemnation 
and sanctions. The article examines the cases of post-coup authoritarian consolidation 
in Fiji and Egypt to illustrate the arguments.  
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Recent research has pointed to the the emergence of ‘democratic coups’ in the post-
Cold War era – unconstitutional seizures of power that act as the midwife of democratic 
rule due to the swift holding of post-coup elections (Varol 2012; J. Powell 2014; 
Trithart 2013). This pattern has in turn been attributed to the increasing use of 
democratic conditionality in the post-Cold War era, as (mostly) Western states and 
international organizations use democratic enforcement measures to pressure coup 
leaders to give up the reins of power (Marinov and Goemans 2014). In this article, I 
argue that these recent accounts oversell the democratic coup thesis, and fail to 
acknowledge both the extent of authoritarian resilience after coups and the role played 
by international autocratic sponsors in underwriting post-coup autocracy. I make two 
contributions that shed light on the politics of post-coup trajectories.  
First, through an analysis of the post-coup trajectories of coup countries after 1991 
I show that there are a number of problems with the recent narrative that coups are 
increasingly associated with democracy. While coups are increasingly followed by the 
introduction of some of the institutional trappings of democracy, this trend has not been 
universal and many of the states that have held elections have done so as part of a 
process of introducing some form of competitive authoritarian regime. Too often, the 
recent research on the relationship between coups and democracy has focused 
excessively on the role of electoral politics. Yet, elections, even competitive ones, are 
compatible with forms of autocratic as well as democratic rule (Schedler 2006; Gandhi 
and Lust-Okar 2009). Several regimes that held elections shortly after experiencing 
coups nonetheless continued to exhibit strong authoritarian tendencies, as incumbents 
worked to resist genuine democratic rule (e.g. Cambodia after its 1997 coup). Other 
regimes, such as Pakistan after 1999 and Egypt after 2013, held deeply flawed elections, 
and a number of regimes held no post-coup elections within five years (e.g. Fiji after 
2006). On average, coup-stricken countries experience only a negligible increase in 
democracy levels (less than one point on the Polity scale), and many experience steep 
reductions. The association of coups and democracy is thus one that should be treated 
with caution, and there is ample evidence that authoritarian resilience remains a core 
feature of post-coup politics in the contemporary world. Overall, coups are not a force 
for democratic change.  
Second, I identify the role played by international sponsors of autocratic regimes in 
accounting for patterns of post-coup authoritarian resilience. Recent approaches to 
explaining post-coup trajectories have focused excessively on the actions and influence 
of pro-democratic international actors. While international democratizing pressures 
have undoubtedly played a role in increasing the rates of initial post-coup elections, the 
full variation in post-coup outcomes must be accounted for with reference to the 
permissive and supportive policies of external actors. Two factors contribute to a 
supportive international environment for post-coup incumbents. First, if a state is 
strategically important, Western actors may refrain from enforcing their democratic 
conditionality provizions, and may instead offer robust assistance. Coup leaders that 
seize power in strategically important states, even if they are highly dependent on 
external donors, may thus receive an easy ride. Second, many states enjoy a broad 
spectrum of international linkages, and ties to non-Western autocratic powers can 
facilitate crucial external support. Even when Western actors impose costly sanctions, 
non-Western autocracies can sponsor coup leaders in diplomatic and material ways that 
compensate for other losses.  
I illustrate these dynamics with reference to events in the wake of coups in Fiji and 
Egypt, both of which enjoyed supportive international environments for post-coup 
authoritarian consolidation. The Fijian coup of 2006 was led by army leader Frank 
Bainimarama, who refused to hold post-coup elections despite intense pressure from 
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neighbouring democracies. Instead, Bainimarama presided over a closed political 
system and actively suppressed political competition before finally holding elections in 
2014. His freedom to manoeuvre in a context of Western condemnation and sanctions 
was crucially enhanced by robust diplomatic and material support from China. More 
recently, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s 2013 coup in Egypt was greeted by its allies 
with either mild criticism or fulsome praise, and with a range of diplomatic and 
economic responses that provided a permissive, and at certain points a highly 
supportive, international environment for the consolidation of post-coup 
authoritarianism. Both Fiji and Egypt benefited from their regional strategic importance 
and their diverse spectrum of international linkages.  
 
 
POST-COUP AUTHORITARIAN CONSOLIDATION 
To date, the political analysis of coups has tended to focus on the sources of coup risk, 
and the factors that make coups more or less likely to occur (Johnson, Slater, and 
McGowan 1984; Londregan and Poole 1990; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Roessler 2011; 
Quinlivan 1999). By contrast, there is limited analysis of the politics of post-coup 
politics, and it is only in recent years that scholars have sought to systematically analyse 
the political trajectory of coup countries (Marinov and Goemans 2014; J. Powell 2014). 
The long-term outcomes of coups vary widely across cases, not least because post-coup 
leaders vary in their capacity to retain the power they have gained. Although scholars 
are increasingly recognizing the international determinants of post-coup trajectories, to 
date they have emphasized the democracy-supporting influences of international actors, 
and under-appreciated the role of international sponsors of post-coup autocracy.  
Coup plotters face a number of challenges to their efforts to consolidate and solidify 
their rule. As Svolik has shown, most autocratic rulers are dislodged by coups, and 
coups are more likely to take place in the early years of an autocrat’s rule (Svolik 2012, 
5, 77). Coup leaders thus have to be fearful of being targets of a coup themselves before 
they can feel secure in power. Furthermore, like all autocratic rulers, coup leaders must 
also be wary of threats from the masses. While some coups are welcomed by large 
sectors of the public (e.g. Suharto’s coup in Indonesia in 1965), coups are often 
associated with an increased risk of mass pro-democracy protests (Brancati 2014, 
1520). After the Thai army removed the elected government in May 2014, protestors 
took to the streets to demand a return to civilian rule, and similar demonstrations took 
place on the first anniversary of the coup in May 2015 (Sridharan 2015; BBC 2014). 
Even though the 2013 coup in Egypt was strongly supported among large sections of 
Egyptian society, supporters of the ousted President Morsi mobilized to denounce the 
coup, prompting a brutal and violent crackdown by the army (BBC News 2015). 
The ability of coup plotters to successfully navigate these challenges and consolidate 
authoritarian rule rests on a number of diverse factors, many of them rooted in domestic 
politics. Although there is little dedicated scholarship on the sources of post-coup 
authoritarian resilience, insights from the wider literature on authoritarianism shed light 
on many important coup cases. Elite cohesion plays an important role in reducing the 
risk from rival elites, and coup leaders thus rely in part on the unity of key actors within 
the new regime. For cases of military coups, military unity obviously plays a crucial 
role. Military coups are frequently spearheaded by a single branch of the military, rather 
than the institution as a whole, and it is by no means guaranteed that the other branches 
of the military will support the coup leaders (Singh 2014). Cleavages within the military 
often result in failed coups, but even when coups are successful, institutional 
factionalism can undermine the prospects for stable and enduring authoritarianism. For 
example, Thailand’s history of short-lived military regimes punctuated by military 
coups in the decades after WWII was the result of endemic military factionalism, with 
rival military leaders consistently seeking to out-manoeuvre one another. By contrast, 
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a potent threat of communist mobilization in Indonesia forged military unity that 
contributed to prolonged rule after Suharto’s coup of 1966 (Slater 2010, 241).  
Elite unity and cohesion can also be facilitated by the use of political institutions. 
Autocratic regimes that utilize legislative institutions are likely to endure much longer 
than those that do not (Svolik 2012, 111/2; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). The creation 
of ruling political parties can channel public support and facilitate co-option and 
oversight of potential elite rivals. Enduring post-coup autocratic regimes in countries 
such as Egypt and Iraq rested in significant part on the establishment of ruling political 
parties (Brownlee 2007). Coup leaders also often combine institutional innovations 
with political repression, outlawing opposition parties, imprisoning rival elites and 
using violence against the public. For example, Suharto did not rely on military unity 
alone, and also engaged in large-scale and brutal repression of his communist rivals 
(Boudreau 2009). 
Yet the fate of post-coup regimes does not rest exclusively on domestic politics, and 
international factors play an important role. Some international forces lower rather than 
raise the prospects for authoritarian consolidation when coups are concerned. I follow 
Powell and Thyne’s definition of a coup as entailing ‘illegal and overt attempts by the 
military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive’, and 
coups are thus distinguished from efforts to introduce or consolidate authoritarianism 
that are initiated by sitting incumbents, such as electoral fraud or violent repression (J. 
M. Powell and Thyne 2011, 252). Since the end of the Cold War, an emerging 
normative agenda in favour of democratic rule has placed a special emphasis on 
countering political coups, and an ‘anti-coup norm’ has been increasingly 
institutionalized (Shannon et al. 2015). In the realm of international democracy 
enforcement, coups are often treated differently from other breaches of democratic 
norms and practice. Coups are highly visible, and cannot easily be concealed in the 
ways that some forms of electoral fraud and political repression can be obscured 
(Beaulieu and Hyde 2009). When a coup takes place, there is little room for doubt about 
what has happened and who is responsible. Similarly, the very fact that coups are 
pursued by opponents of incumbents, rather than incumbents themselves, gives rise to 
greater international opprobrium. Decisions about democratic enforcement are made 
by incumbent leaders, and it is not surprising that they are more interested in punishing 
behaviour that threatens incumbents than behaviour that prolongs incumbent rule. For 
example, while the African Union has suspended several member states in the wake of 
political coups, including Togo in 2005, Guinea in 2008, and Egypt in 2013, it has 
tended to be much more lenient in response to election irregularities and other forms of 
democratic backsliding (Magliveras 2011; Williams 2007, 274). Coup plotters are thus 
often subject to unusually high levels of international punishment compared to 
incumbent leaders who seek to maintain power through non-democratic means. This 
dynamic contributes to the striking nature of the democratic coup thesis, which 
emphasizes the democratizing effects of these brazen practices, while making no claims 
about other forms of autocratic behaviour carried out by incumbents.   
Insights from the literature on the international dimensions of democratization 
highlight how external actors can pressurize post-coup regimes and increase the 
prospects for post-coup transitions to democracy rather than autocratic consolidation. 
There are two broad mechanisms that are relevant for post-coup regimes. First, 
international actors can enhance the domestic threats that post-coup regimes face from 
both rival elites and the masses. In terms of rival elites, external actors can support the 
ousted government and work to restore the former authorities to power, thus increasing 
the risk that the coup leaders will themselves be ousted. For example, the international 
community played a major role in supporting the return to power of political leaders 
ousted by coups in both Haiti after the 1991 coup and Sierra Leone after 1997 (Halperin 
and Lomasney 1998). In terms of the masses, international attention and condemnation 
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can inform and embolden domestic opposition actors, and contribute to domestic 
protests.1 The second mechanism entails a reduction of the capacity of the new regime 
to respond to such threats. International actors can use punishments such as trade 
sanctions or reductions in financial aid that can materially affect the capacity of the 
ruling government. Several international organizations have introduced provisions to 
sanction member states whose leaders have acquired power by overthrowing elected 
governments (Wobig 2015; Legler and Tieku 2010). 
The most well-developed account of post-coup political development that takes 
international forces seriously is offered by Marinov and Goemans, and focuses 
primarily on the democracy-supporting and autocracy-subverting role of international 
actors. The authors make two significant contributions. First, they identify a post-Cold 
War trend away from post-coup authoritarian consolidation. Prior to 1991, most coups 
were followed by the consolidation of enduring authoritarian regimes. In contrast, after 
1991 most coups have been followed by free and fair elections within five years 
(Marinov and Goemans 2014). This finding is supported by other recent research. For 
example, Thyne and Powell’s analysis of a global sample of authoritarian regimes 
suggests that coups can increase the likelihood of democracy, and do so in particular in 
the types of regime that otherwise would be most resistant to democracy (e.g. regimes 
with strongly authoritarian or long-standing leaders) (Thyne and Powell 2014). This 
association between coups and democracy has given rise to the idea of the ‘democratic 
coup’, in which coup leaders overthrow an autocratic leader with a view to guiding the 
country to democracy rather than for personal gain and power (Varol 2012; J. Powell 
2014; Trithart 2013).  
Second, Marinov and Goemans offer an original theory for this shift in post-coup 
trajectories, and argue that the increase in international democracy promotion explains 
the shift away from post-coup authoritarian consolidation. With the end of the Cold 
War, western states and international organizations developed a strong normative 
preference for democracy, and increasingly used their material leverage to promote 
democratic development abroad. In particular, the rise of democratic conditionality 
created a new incentive structure for coup leaders who come to power in countries that 
rely on international donors for significant national income. Countries that are 
dependent on aid are much more likely to be vulnerable to democratic conditionality 
applied by their donors, and more likely to introduce elections to satisfy those donors 
as a result. In this account, the combination of aid dependence and international 
democratic conditionality explains the decline of post-coup authoritarian resilience 
(Marinov and Goemans 2014).  
 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND POST-COUP AUTHORITARIANISM  
In contrast with the arguments outlined above, I argue that recent accounts of the 
relationship between coups and post-coup regimes have oversold the link between 
coups and democracy, and have neglected the patterns of authoritarian resilience in 
many post-coup settings. While increasing rates of post-coup elections are not in doubt, 
the contribution of these elections to processes of genuine democratization has so far 
been taken too much at face value. While elections can serve as a pathway to sustainable 
democracy, they may also be used by sitting incumbents to entrench authoritarian rule 
and facilitate incumbent survival rather than act as any kind of threat to it (Lindberg 
2009; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Coups still frequently give rise to closed or 
competitive authoritarian regimes (discussed further in the next section).  
Furthermore, while international politics undoubtedly plays a role in encouraging 
elections in the wake of political coups, insufficient attention has been paid to the 
                                                
1 For a discussion of similar dynamics regarding election monitoring, see (Kelley 
2012, 103; Tucker 2007, 541). 
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diversity of international influences that coup leaders are subjected to. Marinov and 
Goemans, for example, explore only the western, pro-democratic international 
influences on domestic-level coup leaders. However, a growing literature on the 
international politics of authoritarian rule points to the crucial role of international 
supporters of autocratic incumbents (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Tolstrup 2013a; 
Vanderhill 2013). So-called ‘black knights’ (including both democratic and autocratic 
states) have been shown to support and protect autocratic regimes under a wide range 
of circumstances, often motivated by a desire to keep compliant elites in place and 
avoid the instability that regime change can sometimes bring about (Ambrosio 2014; 
Tolstrup 2015; Levitsky and Way 2010, 41; von Soest 2015; Whitehead 2014). In order 
to understand the variation in post-coup trajectories, and in particular the resilience of 
authoritarianism in many coup countries, it is essential to examine not only the pro-
democracy pressure that coup leaders are subjected to from Western states and 
international organizations, but also the permissive and supportive international 
environments that are often created by the active sponsorship received from supportive 
external (Tansey 2016a). Many coup leaders find that they are located within an 
international environment that includes not only critical democracy enforcers, but also 
supportive international sponsors. While ‘linkage to the West’ can create pressures for 
democratization, strategic interests can sometimes override its influences and linkages 
with autocratic regimes can help bolster the position of post-coup incumbents (Levitsky 
and Way 2010; Tolstrup 2013b; Vanderhill 2013). Some of these considerations have 
been incorporated into studies of the causes of coups (Thyne 2010), but the scholarship 
on the consequences of coups has yet to adequately consider them. 
To fully appreciate the wider international influences on post-coup trajectories, it is 
therefore necessary to examine the full ‘linkage spectrum’ that each country has with 
external actors, and assess the type of international environment it is located within 
(Tansey 2016a). Historical and deep-rooted linkages with autocratic actors can generate 
international support for post-coup governments, and coup leaders often appeal to a 
state’s historical allies to approve of their actions. Coups that take place in strategically 
important countries may also receive external support if they further the strategic 
interests of outside powers.2  Consequently, many coup plotters find that their interests 
align with those of influential external actors, and once they come to power they enjoy 
an international environment that is largely un-constraining. 
For some, the post-coup international environment may simply be a permissive one, 
and for various reasons international actors may refrain from punishing the new elites. 
Although Marinov and Goemans’ analysis suggests that economic dependence will 
lead coup plotters to introduce elections for fear of Western punishment, international 
conditions are frequently not enforced even in highly dependent countries. Many post-
Cold War coup cases have been highly dependent on external donors, but were not 
subject to the kind of democratic enforcement that would create major incentives for 
democratic reform. Research by von Soest and Wahman highlights the variation in 
democratic sanctions by Western powers, and demonstrates the uneven international 
response to international coups. Their dataset of democratic sanctions episodes reveals 
a number of enforcement actions against post-coup authorities, but also shows that 
multiple post-Cold War coup cases, including aid dependent countries such as Burundi, 
Mali, and Mauritania, that were not subject to democratic sanctions in the years after 
the coup took place (von Soest and Wahman 2015a). Elsewhere, democratic 
enforcement was relatively half-hearted or short-lived. In the wake of the 1997 coup in 
Cambodia, Japan (Cambodia’s largest donor) temporarily cut off international aid. Yet 
                                                
2 On the strategic logic behind international reactions to authoritarian regimes and 
practices, see for example (Brownlee 2012; Donno 2010; von Soest and Wahman 
2015b). 
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it resumed aid within a matter of weeks based on verbal guarantees of reform, rather 
than any real change (Refworld 2015). Cambodia did go on to hold elections in 1998 
but these contributed only to the consolidation of competitive authoritarianism, and 
Cambodia been classified as ‘Not Free’ by Freedom House for every year since those 
elections. Similarly, although the US has a legal obligation to cut off aid to countries 
where democratic leaders have been removed through a coup, it is often cautious in 
applying the rule and regularly avoids using the ‘coup’ word for purely political 
purposes (Fisher 2013).  
Many coup leaders, however, benefit from more than a permissive environment, and 
receive active and intentional international support. Once offered, international 
sponsorship can help consolidate post-coup authoritarianism in a number of ways, 
involving both informational and material mechanisms. In informational terms, 
international sponsors can offer clear signals of support that can help consolidate the 
position of post-coup incumbents.3 If international supporters offer swift recognition of 
the new government, it can provide legitimacy to the new regime. Recognition of the 
new authorities sends a clear signal of external support that can reassure elite actors and 
increase the prospects for elite cohesion.4 It can also send a signal of the strength of the 
regime to the public, and dampen the appetite for public protests. Vocal diplomatic 
support of this kind can also involve reinforcing the narrative of the coup plotters, as 
external actors endorse their stated reasons for undertaking the coup and denounce their 
critics (see the discussion of Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s 2013 coup below). 
In material terms, international sponsors can provide newly installed coup leaders 
with financial or security support to assist their efforts to consolidate their power. Such 
actions bolster the capacity of the new authorities to fend off potential challenges and 
increase the prospects for authoritarian consolidation. As several authors have 
observed, authoritarian resilience depends in part on the capacity of state institutions 
(Levitsky and Way 2010; Way 2005; Slater 2010). International sponsorship that 
contributes to state capacity can thus facilitate regime consolidation. External 
supporters can also serve to counter the negative effects of sanctions that may be 
applied by more critical international actors, as new loans or aid compensate for the 
losses incurred by democratic enforcement measures. Such sanctions-busting 
behaviour can protect the new incumbents from the most damaging material effects of 
international censure (Early 2011).  
I also argue that these supportive effects of external sponsorship of autocratic elites 
will be particularly critical in post-coup scenarios. Autocratic actors often experience 
surges of foreign attention in the wake of autocratic behaviour, when they find 
themselves under heightened levels of international scrutiny. When coup plotters face 
this international scrutiny, they are in a particularly fragile position as they have just 
seized power and must scramble to establish rule over state institutions and the wider 
society, often in the face of considerable opposition (Roessler 2011). By contrast, other 
forms of autocratic behaviour that attract international attention are often carried out by 
elites who already enjoy the advantages of incumbency. Election fraud, for example, is 
usually pursued by incumbents who have already established a firm grip on the levers 
of government and who are seeking to prolong their rule (Hyde 2011; Lehoucq 2003). 
International sponsors of newly-installed coup leaders can thus play a more critical role 
in solidifying their rule by protecting and shielding them during a particularly 
vulnerable period.  
In sum, advocates of the democratic coup thesis are correct to suggest that coups are 
not the same as other forms of authoritarian practice (such as fraud or repression), and 
that the international politics of coups are distinct from the international politics of these 
                                                
3 On the role of signals prior to coups, see (Thyne 2010). 
4 For a similar argument regarding the politics of repression, see (Nepstad 2013) 
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other practices. However, I depart from the advocates of the democratic coup thesis by 
questioning whether the particularities of post-coup politics are on balance favourable 
for democracy. I argue that it would be erroneous to view coups as the midwife of 
democracy, even in countries that are economically dependent on Western powers. The 
international politics of post-coup trajectories relate not just to the pro-democratic 
pressures that coup leaders face, but also to their own strategic importance and the ties 
they enjoy to supportive international allies. We should not expect coups to lead to 
democracy, and must examine the full range of international influences on those who 
illegally seize the power of the state. In the sections that follow I offer empirical support 
for these arguments. The next section presents descriptive statistics that show the limits 
of the association between coups and democracy, and highlights the regularity of post-
coup authoritarian consolidation. The subsequent sections examine the international 
sources of post-coup authoritarian resilience in the Fijian and Egyptian cases.  
 
 
 
THE DIVERSITY OF POST-COUP TRAJECTORIES 
One of the problems with current treatments of the relationship between coups and post-
coup regime trajectories is that elections are often equated with the attainment of 
democracy. Although elections are a central element of democracy and are a crucial 
step in the process of successful democratization (Lindberg 2009), they are not a 
sufficient condition for the successful emergence of democracy itself. The spread of 
elections in the post-Cold War period is not a reliable indicator of the spread of 
democracy, as many rulers have found ways to use elections to preserve authoritarian 
forms of rule even while keeping international actors satisfied (Levitsky and Way 2010; 
Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Even where transitional elections are free and fair, 
democratic consolidation is far from guaranteed, and many countries struggle to build 
upon the promise of initial free and fair elections and quickly relapse into some forms 
of authoritarianism (Kapstein and Converse 2008). Consequently, findings about the 
relationship between coups and elections cannot easily be translated into findings about 
coups and democracy, and the language of ‘democratic coups’ is thus highly 
misleading. While there has been a clear post-Cold War shift away from universal post-
coup authoritarianism, coups frequently still give rise to closed autocratic regimes and 
often pave the way for electoral forms of autocracy that fall short of the minimum 
standards of democracy.  
Taking the analysis of Marinov and Goemans as a starting point, in this section I 
examine the post-coup political trajectory of all coup countries after 1991, and use 
descriptive statistics to highlight the extent of post-coup authoritarian resilience in the 
post-Cold War period. Marinov and Goemans’ central argument is that post-1991 coup 
countries have had a much greater likelihood of being followed by competitive 
elections rather than durable authoritarian rule, and that consequently the ‘new 
generation of coups has been far less harmful for democracy than their historical 
predecessors’ (Marinov and Goemans 2014). I do not seek to contradict the idea that 
there has been a shift in patterns after the Cold War, but I show that despite the trend 
towards post-coup elections, authoritarian rule remains a common outcome in countries 
that experience coups. Examination of the post-coup politics in all post-1991 cases 
suggests that coups in these settings are not associated with transitions to durable and 
high quality democracy in most cases, and that coups still regularly give rise to 
autocratic regimes.   
Table 1 shows the post-1991 coup cases listed in Powell and Thyne’s coup dataset 
up until 2015 (J. M. Powell and Thyne 2011), as well as a series of measures of their 
post-coup political trajectories, including the presence or absence of free and fair 
elections, and their levels of political freedom. Two measures are used to capture the 
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extent of democracy or autocracy, based on both Polity and Freedom House data. If the 
democratic coup thesis is correct, we should expect to see a clear relationship between 
the occurrence of coups and the establishment of democratic regimes. However, no 
such relationship is apparent, and the evidence presented in the table suggests a number 
of important findings that raise questions concerning any simple findings about 
‘democratic coups’.  
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Table 1: Post-Coup Trajectories, 1991-2015 
Country	
Year	of	
Coup	
Polity	
1yr	
before	
Polity	
5yrs	
after		
Polity	
2014	
Freedom	
House	
5yrs	after	
Freedom	
House		
2014	
Elections	
within	5yrs		
Election	
Year	
Lesotho	 1991	 -7	 8	 8	 PF	 F	 Fair	 1993	
Mali	 1991	 -7	 7	 5	 F	 PF	 Fair	 1992	
Haiti	 1991	 7	 7	 0	 PF	 PF	 Fair	 1995	
Thailand	 1991	 3	 9	 -3	 PF	 NF	 Fair	 1992	
Afghanistan	 1992	 -8	 -7	 -1	 NF	 NF	 No	election	 	
Sierra	Leone	 1992	 -6	 0	 7	 NF	 PF	 Fair	 1996	
Algeria	 1992	 -2	 -3	 2	 NF	 NF	 Fair		 1995	
Nigeria	 1993	 -5	 -1	 4	 PF	 PF	 Unfair	 1998	
Lesotho	 1994	 8	 2	 8	 PF	 F	 Fair	 1998	
Rwanda	 1994	 -7	 -6	 -3	 NF	 NF	 No	election	 	
Gambia	 1994	 8	 -5	 -5	 NF	 NF	 Fair		 1996	
Qatar	 1995	 -10	 -10	 -10	 NF	 NF	 No	election	 	
Burundi	 1996	 0	 0	 6	 NF	 NF	 No	election	 	
Sierra	Leone	 1996	 -7	 2	 7	 PF	 PF	 Fair		 1996	
Niger	 1996	 8	 5	 4	 PF	 PF	 Fair	 1996	
Cambodia	 1997	 1	 2	 2	 NF	 NF	 Fair	 1998	
Sierra	Leone	 1997	 4	 5	 7	 PF	 PF	 Fair	 2002	
Guinea-Bissau	 1999	 0	 -1	 6	 PF	 PF	 Fair		 1999	
Ivory	Coast	 1999	 -6	 0	 4	 NF	 PF	 Fair		 2000	
Comoros	 1999	 4	 6	 9	 PF	 PF	 Unfair	 2002	
Niger	 1999	 -6	 6	 4	 PF	 PF	 Fair	 1999	
Pakistan	 1999	 7	 -5	 7	 NF	 PF	 Unfair	 2002	
Fiji	 2000	 6	 6	 2	 PF	 PF	 Fair	 2001	
Sao	Tome	 2003	 -	 -	 -	 F	 F	 No	election	 	
Central	Afr	Rep	 2003	 5	 -1	 0	 PF	 NF	 Fair	 2005	
Guinea-Bissau	 2003	 5	 6	 6	 PF	 PF	 Unfair	 2004	
Mauritania	 2005	 -6	 -2	 -2	 NF	 NF	 Unfair	 2006	
Togo	 2005	 -2	 -2	 -2	 PF	 PF	 Fair		 2005	
Thailand	 2006	 9	 7	 -3	 PF	 NF	 Fair	 2007	
Fiji	 2006	 6	 -4	 2	 PF	 PF	 No	election	 	
Guinea	 2008	 -1	 4	 4	 PF	 PF	 Fair	 2010	
Mauritania	 2008	 4	 -2	 -2	 NF	 NF	 Fair	 2009	
Honduras	 2009	 7	 7	 7	 PF	 PF	 Fair	 2009	
Madagascar	 2009	 7	 6	 6	 PF	 PF	 Fair	 2013	
Niger	 2010	 -3	 n/a	 4	 n/a	 PF	 Fair	 2011	
Egypt	 2011	 -3	 n/a	 -4	 n/a	 NF	 Fair	 2012	
Maldives	 2012	 -	 n/a	 -	 n/a	 PF	 Fair	 2013	
Mali	 2012	 7	 n/a	 5	 n/a	 PF	 Fair		 2013	
Guinea-Bissau	 2012	 6	 n/a	 6	 n/a	 PF	 Fair	 2014	
Egypt	 2013	 -3	 n/a	 -4	 n/a	 NF	 Unfair	 2014	
Ukraine	 2014	 6	 n/a	 4	 n/a	 PF	 Fair	 2014	
Thailand		 2014	 7	 n/a	 -3	 n/a	 NF	 No	election	 	
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Burkina	Faso	 2014	 0	 n/a	 0	 n/a	 PF	 Fair	 2015	
Data Sources: Polity IV 2014 (Polity2 score); Freedom House Freedom in the World 2015 report; Data on 
coup countries and years based on ‘successful coups’ from Powell and Thyne, ‘Global Instances of Coups from 
1950 to 2010: A New Dataset.’; Data on election fairness until 2009 based on Marinov and Goemans ‘Coups and 
Democracy’, and coded by the author after 2009. Scores are ‘-’ for missing data and n/a if not applicable. 
 
 
First, while the table demonstrates a clear pattern of post-coup elections across most 
cases, the trend is not universal. A small number of countries that experienced coups in 
the post-1991 period refrained from holding any elections within five years of the coup, 
including Afghanistan after its 1992 coup, Rwanda after 1994, and Fiji after 2006. 
Several others held elections that were not free and fair, including Pakistan after the 
Musharraf coup of 1999 (flawed elections in 2002) and Mauritania after its 2005 coup 
(flawed elections in 2006). While most of the 43 coups between 1991-2015 were 
followed by free and fair elections, a significant minority of 12 held no, or only flawed, 
elections. Post-Cold War coups have thus given rise to many closed authoritarian 
regimes.  
A second feature of the data concerns the levels of political freedom that can be 
found in the set of coup cases. Using both Polity and Freedom House data, it is possible 
to determine whether post-1991 coup countries have experienced transitions 
democratic regimes, or have instead consolidated authoritarian forms of rule. An 
analysis of the Freedom House status for each country five years after the coup is not 
particularly encouraging. To consider this measure, it is necessary to restrict the sample 
to those coups between 1991-2009 in order to allow a five-year gap to assess the 
Freedom House verdict (Freedom House’s 2015 scores cover the 2014 calendar year). 
Of the 34 coups that took place between 1991-2009, in only two cases was the country 
rated as Free within five years of the coup, while in 20 cases the country was rated as 
Partly Free after five years and 12 were rated Not Free. Even taking a longer 
perspective, the pattern is remarkably similar and not particularly encouraging.  Of the 
29 countries that experienced coups between 1991-2014, and are thus included in the 
2015 Freedom in the World report, only two were rated as ‘Free’ (Lesotho and Sao 
Tome and Principe). Sixteen were rated as Partly Free, and 11 were rated as Not Free.  
The evidence from Polity presents a more optimistic picture, but still shows a clear 
trend in which most countries that experience a coup struggle to achieve stable 
democratic rule and instead consolidate some form of autocratic regime. Polity scores 
are only available until 2014, and no Polity scores are available for two small island 
countries that experienced coups (the Maldives and Sao Tome & Principe). The Polity 
scale runs from -10 to 10, and Polity recommends scoring cases from -10 to -6 as 
autocracies, -5 to 5 as anocracies, and 6-10 as democracies. Of the 33 coups between 
1991-2009 for which Polity has scores, only eleven (one third) achieve scores of 6 or 
above (representing democracy) within five years. Three were autocratic, and the 
remaining 19 were anocracies. Just under half (16) were scored at 0 or below five years 
after the coup. Turning to the longer-term measure to assess the current status of these 
coup countries, the picture is broadly similar. Of the 28 countries for which Polity has 
2014 scores, nine are democracies, one is an autocracy and 18 are anocracies. Polity 
data thus suggest a pattern in which the majority of countries that experience coups 
struggle to move beyond limited levels of democratic rule, and many fall far short of 
the threshold of democracy. While Polity offers a slightly more encouraging picture 
than Freedom House (more countries in the top category, and fewer in the bottom) both 
sets of data suggest that the post-1991 coup experience has clearly not helped usher in 
a wave of stable democracies.  
Comparison of Polity figures before and after each coup also reinforces the limits of 
the democratic coup thesis. While several countries registered significant positive 
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changes in their Polity score when comparing the year prior to the coup with the five 
year post-coup score (e.g. Lesotho and Mali after their 1991 coups) many countries also 
experienced significant decreases (Gambia after 1994, Fiji after 2006) and many others 
registered little or no change over time. On average, the countries that experienced 
coups between 1991-2009 only experienced a rise of 0.8 in Polity levels after five years, 
a result that undermines the contention that coups are a force for democratic 
development. Thinking in terms of possible counterfactual scenarios, the pre- and post-
coup trends also suggest that while some countries would not have achieved their 
subsequent levels of democracy without the catalysing effects of their coups, many 
others would have been better off in democratic terms (or largely unchanged) had their 
coups never taken place. This lack of any clear trend towards of post-coup democratic 
gain is contrary to the expectations raised by the democratic coup thesis.  
Third, a striking feature of the table is that several countries appear multiple times, 
suggesting that coup countries struggle to maintain post-coup regimes without 
subsequently experiencing another coup. Young democracies are often highly fragile 
(Kapstein and Converse 2008), and the figures show that many of the post-1991 post-
coup regimes succumbed to subsequent coups within a short number of years. Nine 
countries that held post-coup elections after 1991 went on to experience at least one 
more coup in the wake of those elections. These multiple-coup cases were (with coup 
years in parenthesis): Egypt (2011 and 2013), Fiji (2000 and 2006), Guinea-Bissau 
(1999, 2003 and 2012), Lesotho (1991 and 1994), Mali (1991 and 2012), Mauritania 
(2005 and 2008), Niger (1996, 1999 and 2010), Sierra Leone (1992, 1996 and 1997), 
and Thailand (1991, 2006 and 2014). Far from ushering in stable democracy, the initial 
coups in the nine repeat offenders failed to usher stable regimes of any kind.  
Overall, therefore, the trends in post-coup politics after 1991 do not suggest we live 
in an age of ‘democratic coups’. While many coups are followed by some form of free 
and fair election within five years, the trend is far from universal. Coup leaders still 
often cling to power and coups regularly give rise to new forms of autocratic rule, often 
with the use of façade elections. Coups are no longer the near-certain death sentence 
for democracy that they were during the Cold War years, but authoritarian resilience 
still remains a common feature of post-coup politics. The following sections examine 
two case studies to illustrate the role that international politics plays in fostering post-
coup authoritarian consolidation: the 2013 coup in Egypt and the 2006 coup in Fiji. The 
former was characterized by shallow ‘enforcement’ by the United States, as well as 
robust sponsorship by powerful states within the region. The latter case featured intense 
enforcement efforts by Western powers that were nonetheless offset by a surge in 
Chinese economic and diplomatic sponsorship. Both cases highlight the ways in which 
permissive and supportive international environments can reinforce the position of 
authoritarian rulers.  
  
 
 
 
US POLICY AND EGYPT’S 2013 COUP 
The role that international sponsorship plays in the consolidation of post-coup regimes 
is clearly illustrated by the international reaction to the Egyptian coup of 2013. The 
Arab uprisings of 2011 led to the swift collapse of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, but 
the aftermath of the uprisings did not ultimately lead to a transition to democratic rule. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi was elected to office in the country’s first 
free and fair presidential elections in 2012, but quickly clashed with both the military 
and the judiciary (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015 ). After public protests 
mobilized against Morsi, the military intervened and forcefully removed him from 
office in July 2013. A major crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood followed in which 
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its main political party was banned and its key leaders arrested (Kirkpatrick 2013). 
Presidential elections in 2014 brought to power the man who led the coup, former head 
of the armed forces, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.  
The international response to the 2013 coup varied, and reflected the diverse linkage 
spectrum that Egypt enjoys on the international stage. Within Africa, there was 
widespread condemnation, and Egypt was suspended from the African Union under its 
rules governing the unconstitutional removal of leaders from power (it was re-admitted 
one year later) (Reuters 2013). Yet the international reaction elsewhere was more 
sanguine, and its most influential international partners and donors largely backed the 
regime. Consequently, although the broader international reaction was contested, with 
the presence of both critics and supporters, the international actors that counted most 
(Egypt’s principal donors) created a largely supportive international environment. The 
US in particular, one of Egypt’s biggest donors and a long-standing political ally, 
offered only limited criticism and punitive measures in response to the coup, and its 
overall policy was broadly supportive of the military’s actions. The US had a number 
of strategic motivations that informed this policy. Egypt had long represented a 
strategically important partner in furthering several of the US’s interests in the region, 
including the security of Israel and containment of Islamist political movements (Chase, 
Hill, and Kennedy 1996; Sharp 2014). Over time, the two countries had developed 
extensive linkages at the highest levels, forming ‘a network of common interests, values 
and practices’ (Brownlee 2012, 9). The militaries of both countries have close ties, and 
many of Egypt’s senior military figures, including Sisi, were trained or educated in the 
US (AFP 2013; Carlstrom 2014).  
As a result of these close ties and interests, the US remained a largely supportive 
ally to the new authorities in the wake of the coup. Washington sought to avoid 
triggering potentially damaging punitive measures against the regime, and also offered 
a series of diplomatic statements that sent clear signals of support. Under US law, US 
aid money cannot be ‘expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose 
duly elected Head of Government is deposed by military coup or decree.’5 In the wake 
of Morsi’s forced removal from office, there was an intense debate within Washington 
about whether to describe the events as a coup. US Secretary of State John Kerry 
described the issue as ‘complex and difficult’, and argued that the law would have to 
be balanced with the threat of ‘civil war’ that existed before the coup, suggesting that 
mitigating circumstances might apply (Reuters 2015). The White House Press 
Secretary explicitly cited US interests in explaining its initial policy response, stating 
that ‘it would not be in the best interests of the United States to immediately change 
our assistance programs to Egypt’ (ABC News 2013). Ultimately, the administration 
avoided characterizing Morsi’s overthrow as a coup, and thus shielded the regime from 
automatic and wide-ranging sanctions. In the early weeks after Morsi’s ousting, the US 
administration also offered a number of supportive signals from the highest level. 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel made regular calls to Sisi to reassure him about the 
solidity of the relationship between the two countries (Carlstrom 2014). In some of the 
most striking language from the US government during the period, Secretary of State 
John Kerry commented of the military that ‘in effect, they were restoring democracy’ 
(Bradley 2013). The equation of Morsi’s forceful overthrow and detention with the 
restoration of democratic rule constituted one of the clearest international endorsements 
of the military’s actions.  
After the extent of the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood became clear, 
including a brutal assault on protesters on Rabaa square in August 2013, the US did 
move to restrict some military assistance. Yet this was primarily based on criticism of 
the use of repressive violence rather than coup itself, and it was also presented in 
                                                
5 Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act. See also (Shannon et al. 2015) 
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cautious rather than condemnatory terms. The US withheld delivery of military 
hardware, including helicopters and warplanes, as well as the disbursement of $260m 
for the Egyptian budget (while leaving counterterrorism assistance and other financial 
support in place). However the administration also clearly signalled the temporary 
nature of the restrictions, with one senior official quoted as saying, ‘“This is not meant 
to be permanent; this is meant to be the opposite” (Gordon and Lander 2013). Further 
diplomatic support was quickly forthcoming. Rather than isolating the regime, in 
November 2013, a month after the restrictions were put in place, Kerry made a high-
profile visit to Cairo, where he met with General Sisi and praised the military for 
pursuing its declared ‘roadmap’ to democracy. Kerry also sent further signals about the 
sympathetic position of the US administration, stating that the cut in assistance ‘is not 
a punishment’, and calling it a ‘small issue’ compared to the two countries’ common 
interests (DeYoung 2013). 
When the arms freeze was lifted in March 2015, a year after Sisi has assumed power 
through flawed elections, no effort was made to suggest the Egypt had made the kind 
of democratic progress that had initially been a requirement of lifting the restrictions, 
and the decision was justified with reference to national security interests (the timing 
coincided with deteriorating security conditions in Egypt and the wider region, 
including violence in the Sinai, the rise of ISIS and the decline of security in Libya) 
(Baker 2015).  
The US policy thus fell far short of full democratic enforcement, and the 
administration sent a number clear signals that it was prepared to work with and support 
the coup leaders. If post-coup trajectories are determined in part by the fear of 
enforcement from major donors, Egypt’s post-coup leaders would have had little to 
worry about regarding the long-term support of the United States.  
The international story of Egypt’s post-coup trajectory also includes a role for even 
more supportive international allies, who offered full and unconditional diplomatic and 
material sponsorship. Several Gulf countries offered immediate and unequivocal 
support and ensured that Egypt remained part of a powerful ‘in-group’ of sympathetic 
states. Saudi Arabia was quick to applaud the Egyptian military in the immediate 
aftermath of the coup, issuing a statement offering congratulations to the new interim 
leader, Adly Mansour, and directly praising the military for managing to ‘save Egypt’ 
(Stuster 2016). Saudi Arabia had been a long-standing supporter of the Mubarak 
regime, and viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the Saudi’s preferred model 
of political control both domestically and within the region. A strong Muslim 
Brotherhood administration in Egypt challenged Saudi Arabia’s desire to be the leading 
power in the Middle East, and also offered an alternative model of election-based 
Islamist rule that was viewed in Riyadh as a potential threat to monarchical rule at home 
(Hassan 2015; Ennis and Momani 2013).  
This diplomatic sponsorship was complemented with a large spike in material 
assistance. Within a week of the coup, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates jointly pledged a total of $12billion to Egypt (Khan and Lebaron 2015). The 
Saudi regime had significantly reduced aid to Egypt during Morsi’s presidency, so the 
swift offer of a new and generous economic package starkly illustrated the political 
nature of the assistance (Worth 2013). It represented support for a particular set of 
Egyptian elites, rather than Egypt in general. The package offered crucial support at a 
time when Egypt was struggling economically, as it sought to finance its expensive 
public subsidies despite limited domestic economic productivity (Malik and 
McCormick 2013). Yet while the economic support from the Gulf helped address 
Egypt’s chronic economic problems, it also sent a clear message that any punitive 
action by Egypt’s western donors (including the US) would be offset and compensated 
for by its regional allies. The countries attached no conditionality to the aid package, 
and redoubled their efforts after Sisi’s election to president, offering another $12billion 
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package in 2015 (Kirkpatrick 2015). These figures dwarf the $1.3m in military 
assistance offered annually by the US, and highlight the potential for non-Western allies 
to undercut any leverage that western actors might wish to apply. In the two years after 
the coup, total Gulf aid amounted to $23billion compared to $2.8billion from the US 
(Wehrey 2015, 76). 
Egypt thus received a broad range of diplomatic and material support from its most 
important and influential allies in the wake of the 2013 coup. Even though it was 
subjected to some enforcement measures, they were all temporary, and mostly either 
half-hearted (in the case of the more critical US policies) or relatively pain-free (for 
example, AU suspension for a single year). By contrast, Egypt received much more 
influential diplomatic and material sponsorship, not least in the form of a massive 
injection of funds from Gulf allies in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Far from 
being isolated and exposed because of its dependence on external actors, Egypt’s post-
coup leaders were praised and kept afloat by its most influential donors, facilitating the 
consolidation of authoritarian rule in the ensuing months and years. The following 
section explores a similar dynamic in external support for post-coup authoritarianism 
in Fiji. 
 
 
ELECTION-FREE POLITICS IN POST-COUP FIJI  
Fiji has had a history of coups, but its its 2006 coup was noticeable for its unusual 
aftermath – the principal coup leader, head of the armed forces Commodore Voreqe 
‘Frank’ Bainimarama, resisted domestic and international pressure and refused to hold 
elections until 2014 (elections he comfortably won). The analysis below explores Fiji’s 
post-coup political trajectory after 2006, and highlights in particular the ways in which 
supportive international influences helped Bainimarama to consolidate power even in 
the face of vocal and costly international condemnation.  
Formerly a British colony, Fiji achieved independence in 1970 but struggled to 
consolidate a stable political system due to political tensions between the country’s 
indigenous Fijian population and its large Fiji Indian population. Fiji’s earlier coups 
reflected unease within the indigenous Fijian community at the prospect of political Fiji 
Indian involvement in government (Firth 2012). The 2006 coup differed from the 
earlier instances in that the military stepped in to remove a government that was led 
and supported by the indigenous Fijian community. The rationale for the coup was 
predicated on a stated desire to move beyond the traditional ethnic tensions within the 
country. Bainimarama justified the coup on the basis that Fijian politics needed to be 
transformed in a way that would eradicate ethnic-based politics and lead to new 
political culture based on multiracialism, good governance and freedom from 
corruption. It was presented as a coup that would end the ‘coup culture’ in Fiji and 
usher in a new political landscape that would be free of the ethnic divisions of the past 
(Fraenkel and Firth 2009).  
However, despite initial promises of a ‘roadmap’ to elections, Bainimarama 
assumed the role of Prime Minister and retained it without elections until 2014, when 
he retired from the armed forces to fight, and win, in a free and fair vote (Quoted in 
Fraenkel 2009). This lengthy abrogation of democratic rule, which included a series of 
broken promises, came in the face of extensive domestic and international pressure. 
The international reaction to the coup had been swift and decisive. Australia, New 
Zealand and the European Union were Fiji’a largest donors and all were forceful critics 
of the coup.6  Australia and New Zealand both quickly imposed a range of sanctions, 
including robust travel bans on military personnel and members of the interim 
                                                
6 ODA figures from Fijian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.gov.fj/trade-
policy/international-cooperation/oda-trend 
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administration, as well as the suspension of new development aid. New Zealand 
imposed visa restrictions on Fijian workers, cancelled military training for Fijian 
soldiers and halted the approval of new development assistance schemes (Lal 2007). 
The European Union also sought to put the new post-coup regime under pressure. In 
April 2007, the EU set down a series of conditions for further dialogue with Fiji under 
the ACP-EC Contonou Agreement that covers EU development programmes in the 
region. The EU sought assurances that there would be democratic elections before 
March 2009, as well as evidence of respect for human rights, rule of law and judicial 
independence. Seemingly in response to this sustained international pressure, 
Bainimarama made a public commitment in October 2007 that elections would be held 
in March 2009 in line with international demands. However, by mid-2008 he had 
abandoned the commitment and Fiji thus became one of the few countries in the post-
war period to eschew any form of elections in the years after experiencing a coup.  
Fiji’s experience suggests both domestic and international sources of post-coup 
authoritarian resilience. In domestic terms, the new regime sought to combine its efforts 
at co-optation with strategies designed to marginalize critical voices and institutions. 
Bainimarama relied in part on the acquiescence of the Fijian President, Ratu Josefa 
Iloilo, who addressed the nation and endorsed the coup, stating that Bainimarama had 
acted in the interests of the nation and that the coup was ‘valid in law’. Bainimarama 
also succeeded in recruiting senior figures in the Fijian Labour Party, which largely 
represented the Fiji Indian community and was willing to support Bainimaram on the 
grounds that his coup had ousted a government that was deeply antagonistic to Fiji 
Indian interests (Fraenkel 2006, 45). The regime also moved against potential elite and 
public threats. It marginalized and ultimately disbanded the Great Council of Chiefs 
(GCC), one of the major institutions of political authority and legitimacy for the ethnic 
Fijian chiefly system (Norton 2009, 97/8; Pearlman 2012). It also significantly 
increased the use of repression on civil and political liberties. The constitution was 
abrogated and a state of emergency was introduced that lasted until 2012 under ‘Public 
Emergency Regulations’. Media freedom was strictly curtailed, the right to assembly 
was restricted and opposition actors were targeted with politically motivated court 
cases. Over time, efforts at elite co-optation were abandoned, and two former Prime 
Ministers were pursued in the courts, sending a clear signal of the limits of political 
opposition (Human Rights Watch 2012; Fiji One 2014; Telegraph 2012).  
These domestic strategies were not pursued in isolation, however, and Bainimarama 
also sought to use the international environment in ways that would support his rule. 
Despite its isolation from the West, Fiji’s authoritarian resilience can in part be 
explained by the diversity of its international linkage spectrum, and especially its ties 
to China. Fiji was not just reliant and dependent on Western actors, but also had a long 
history of close relations with China before 2006. Fiji was the first Pacific Island 
country to recognize the PRC in 1975, and it is an open advocate of the ‘One China’ 
policy (although it retains some diplomatic ties with Taiwan) (Yang 2011). Fiji had also 
sought to strengthen ties with China after each of its previous coups, and this strategy 
(dubbed the ‘Look North’ policy) complemented China’s own increasing interest in 
acting as a regional power within the Asia Pacific (Tarte 2010).  
After the 2006 coup, Fiji actively sought to cultivate Chinese assistance, and 
Bainimarama immediately moved to reinvigorate its Look North policy (New York 
Times 2007). China responded by offering support rather than condemnation, and used 
a combination of tools to bolster and shield the post-coup regime in Fiji. A statement 
from the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s deputy director suggested not only support for the 
post-coup government, but also offered a barely disguised criticism of Fiji’s western 
critics: ‘We have always respected Fiji's status as an independent nation and we have 
called on the other countries to do the same and reconsider their attitudes towards Fiji 
and the current situation in the country’ (Fiji Times 2007).  
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China supplemented diplomatic support with increased economic assistance. In 
2005, the year before the coup, China pledged only US$1million to Fiji. Aid and loan 
pledges jumped to US$167million in 2007, the year after the coup. Given a steep 
decline in Australian and New Zealand aid, China helped ‘fill the void’ that was created 
by Western sanctions (The Australian 2009). Consistent with Beijing’s aid and 
development policy across the globe, it has refrained from publicly criticizing the Fijian 
government for its lack of democracy and did not seek to make its economic support 
conditional on election-related progress (Halper 2010). In the following years, China 
and Fiji’s relationship continued to tighten. China offered a $135m loan in 2009 and 
introduced direct flights from Hong Kong in a move that would boost Fijian tourism 
(McGeough 2009). The overall shift in Chinese financial support to Fiji after 2006 
fundamentally changed Fiji’s international economic relations. In the years prior to 
2006, Australia and the EU alternated as Fiji’s largest donor, and China was a negligible 
player. In the year 2006, Australia gave $17.4m, the EU gave $8.4m and China gave 
just $1.4m.7 Between 2006-2013, however, China was Fiji’s largest donor, pushing 
Australia into second place (Lowry Institute 2015; The Economist 2015).  
Fiji’s diplomatic sponsorship in the wake of the coup was also significant. Fiji 
received a significant and high profile visit from vice-President Xi Jinping in February 
2009. At the time, Xi was widely (and correctly) expected to become China’s next 
leader and his visit thus amounted to an endorsement of the post-coup regime from the 
highest levels of Chinese government. Diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks have 
shown that Australia sought to prevent Xi’s visit and appealed to China to join 
international efforts in isolating the Bainimarama regime. Instead, Xi met with directly 
with Bainimarama and signed off on a number of development assistance deals 
(McLean 2011). Although the diplomatic reports suggest that Xi did urge Bainimarama 
to hold elections, no conditions were placed on the assistance deals that were finalized 
(Wikileaks 2009b; Wikileaks 2009a). By 2013, Bainimarama was expressing gratitude 
to China for development assistance in a wide range of areas (Bainimarama 2014).  
Chinese motives were not purely altruistic or normative. During these years Fiji 
became a focal point in the ‘soft balancing’ policies at work in the South Pacific region, 
where China engaged in efforts to balance US, Australian and New Zealand influence 
in the region not through military maneuvering and contestation but through carefully 
cultivated economic and diplomatic alliances (Lanteigne 2012). Consequently, China’s 
support for the Bainimarama regime should not be seen as an exercise in ideologically-
driven autocracy promotion (Tansey 2016b). Yet the implications of its unconditional 
and increasing support for Fiji during the crucial years in the immediate aftermath of 
the 2006 coup were highly significant for authoritarian resilience. By giving 
Bainimarama diplomatic and material assistance, China bolstered the regime at 
precisely the time when its Western partners were seeking to put pressure on it. Chinese 
policy allowed the regime to reinforce its claims to legitimacy by pointing to a powerful 
international ally, while also softening the economic pain associated with the new 
sanctions regime. Consequently, the story of post-coup authoritarian resilience in Fiji 
is not purely a story of ‘strong-man rule’ and domestic political maneuvering. Fiji 
benefited from robust international sponsorship in a way that compensated for its 
dependence on Western actors, and Bainimarama’s post-coup tenure was bolstered and 
shielded by his non-Western international allies. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
                                                
7 ODA figures from Fijian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.gov.fj/trade-
policy/international-cooperation/oda-trend 
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The politics of post-Cold War coups is systematically different from what has gone 
before. During the Cold War, coups were highly likely to initiate long-term and closed 
authoritarian rule. By contrast, recent coups are much more likely to be followed by 
competitive elections than their Cold War predecessors.  Yet authoritarian resilience is 
still a feature of post-coup politics, and international sponsorship plays an important 
role in facilitating post-coup authoritarianism.  
In this article, I have sought to explore the relationship between coups and autocracy 
in greater detail, and to caution against any undue optimism about the rise of the 
‘democratic coup’ and the role of international democratizing pressures. I do not seek 
to contradict existing findings that post-Cold War coups are more likely to be followed 
by competitive elections. Rather, I make two separate arguments. First, I show that 
while most post-1991 coups are indeed followed by competitive elections within five 
years, a significant proportion hold only flawed elections or no elections at all. Even 
among those countries that embrace open electoral competition, many struggle to 
consolidate democracy without backsliding to authoritarian rule and experiencing 
further government overthrows. Overall, while coups are increasingly associated with 
post-coup elections, the pattern is not universal and post-coup authoritarianism is a 
common feature. We do not live in an age of ‘democratic coups’. 
Second, I argue that the variation in post-coup trajectories can be explained in 
significant part by the variation in international environment that coup countries 
experience, which in turn is rooted in each individual country’s strategic importance 
and linkage spectrum. Although there has been a considerable increase in 
democratizing pressures since the end of the Cold War, the international environment 
remains far from constant and countries regularly face a diverse spectrum of linkage 
relationships. These may include close ties to committed and forceful democracy 
promoters, but can also involve ties to democracies who are willing relax their 
democratic conditionality policies to achieve alternative interests, as well as non-
democratic states who have little interest or commitment to promoting democratic rule. 
Even where states are economically dependent on Western democracies, it does not 
follow that they will necessarily face pro-democratic pressures in the wake of 
unconstitutional seizures of power. Democracy promoters can sometimes exact 
powerful and transformative pressure on the countries they target. Yet often they refrain 
from using the leverage they have, and prioritize strategic over ideological goals by 
actively supporting autocratic incumbents. Even when democracy promoters seek to 
wield influence to undermine post-coup authorities, their impact is structured by the 
role of other international actors who wish to sponsor post-coup regimes. International 
autocratic sponsors help consolidate authoritarianism in a number of ways, legitimizing 
coup leaders and their actions, blocking international sanctions, and offering direct 
material assistance to bolster the capacity of post-coup authorities. Acknowledging and 
addressing the role of international autocratic sponsors is essential if we are to gain a 
full and proper understanding of variety of post-coup political trajectories in the post-
Cold War world. 
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